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Student Writing in Law: Fixed Discourse 
Boundaries and Hospitable Crossings
Stephen Price
1 Introduction 
In this article I discuss the ‘acquisition’ of and ‘engagement’ with 
common law discourse attempted by two international postgraduate 
law students in terms of a relationship of hospitality with language. 
Like hospitality, language is marked for Derrida by a structure of 
a ‘promise of a gift’ (Derrida 1998: 21, 66) which at the same time 
can never be given but is ‘always yet to come’ (Derrida 1998: 67). 
Nevertheless, as in hospitality, there is necessarily a sense that this gift 
is real, there is ‘a language’ or specific discourse (such as the discourse 
of common law in English) that one can ‘make oneself at home in’. 
However, as Derrida shows, the logic implied in giving or receiving 
a gift or hospitality at the same time leads to the subversion of its 
possibility. Similarly there is a fundamental aporia in language in which 
the acquisition of language or discourse at the same time depends on 
its impossibility, though this does not foreclose the possibility of an 
engagement or a struggle with it. It is the privileging of one side of 
such a contradiction that Derrida argues cannot be justified and, in 
the context of student writing, the ‘absolute’ distinction very often 
insisted on between ‘paraphrase’ and ‘plagiarism’ fails to acknowledge 
the process of engagement students undergo and the impossibility of 
finally determining the dividing boundary such a ‘rule’ presupposes. 
That is, a focus on the struggle with language, rather than on what 
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makes language ‘mine’ or ‘not mine’, leads to a problematising of 
this distinction. Central then to this discussion is the question of 
boundaries, inclusion/exclusion, and the relationship between subject 
and language. 
2 The Students
Both students referred to in this study were international students 
studying for a postgraduate Master of Laws in an Australian university 
and were part of a small cohort of students who agreed to participate 
in the PhD study this article is drawn from. Quotes by the students 
cited in this article are from interviews held with them. Both students 
had met the minimal English language proficiency entry requirement 
(IELTS 6.5) and had completed a compulsory pre-entry five-week 
English language bridging programme. These two students have 
been selected as ‘telling cases’ in that their writing practices illustrate 
theoretical points made in this article, but it is not claimed that they, 
and the points made, are necessarily representative of student writing 
more generally. The validity of more generalised claims would need to 
be tested against a much broader sample. 
Thuy, a female, Vietnamese student in her thirties, had completed an 
undergraduate degree in law in her country; since graduating, she had 
worked for a number of years as a legal adviser to parliamentarians in her 
country. In this role, she was involved in drafting legislation. She had 
also engaged in discussions with overseas legal advisers who had been 
employed to guide Vietnam as it sought to introduce legislation that 
would meet obligations placed on it by international treaties (treaties 
that the government had either signed or wished to be a signatory to). 
Despite her impressive experience, her exposure to common law had 
been minimal, and she stated she had little understanding of it. 
During the course of interviews she expressed a strong desire to 
‘acquire English’ and to ‘understand western culture’ and she stated that 
an important reason for pursuing postgraduate study in Australia was to 
‘understand common law’, which she appeared to equate on occasions 
with ‘western law’, presumably because of its association with United 
145
Student Writing in Law
States law. She stated that after the opening of Vietnam to the outside 
world, the study of English became popular and she too had decided 
she wanted to understand the language and the ‘west’, although she 
still lacked confidence about her use of English. Nevertheless, during 
her time in Australia she had made great deliberate effort to improve 
her vocabulary by paying attention to new words and phrases she heard, 
often noting them and ‘trying out’ new ways of saying things. She had 
a great interest in English language literature and during her stay in 
Australia had bought many novels which she could not obtain at home. 
She also expressed a strong interest in western popular culture. In her 
interviews, comments about ‘the west’ were often conflated with the 
role of the English language. Her study in Australia thus served the 
interest of engaging at both professional and broader personal levels 
with discourses and cultures she felt were still relatively unknown to 
her, and this process of engaging with a discourse which is ‘other’ to 
one is the concern of this article.
The second student, Narin, was a male from Thailand. He was 
younger than Thuy (in his mid-twenties) and had also completed a 
first degree in Law in his home country. However, unlike Thuy, his 
only legal experience was that which was required to complete his 
professional qualification.1 He had spent a number of months learning 
English in another part of Australia prior to beginning his LLM 
studies, but still did not feel very confident about his English language 
proficiency. Despite this, he had very strong views on a number of social 
issues regulated by the law which he could express quite forcefully. 
His lecturer valued Narin’s opinions, commenting that he was ‘quite 
unlike’ most Asians she taught because of his outspokenness and his 
willingness to seek her out when he needed advice on the research 
assignment he was doing for her course. 
3 Language as hospitality
In his eulogy to Levinas, Derrida reiterates his agreement with him 
that ‘the essence of language is friendship and hospitality’ (2001b: 207). 
This is because language fundamentally entails ‘a relation to the other’ 
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which ensures that one is placed in a relation to language not of mastery 
but of listening and being sensitive to that which one is not already in 
possession of (2005d: 166). This relationship, however, is not simply 
with the idea communicated through an utterance which, in Bakhtin 
for example, always comes to us from prior uses and is ‘saturated’ with 
the voices of others which will always remain present even as we inflect 
and nuance such language with our own voice and make it ‘our own’ 
(Bakhtin 1986). For Derrida, this otherness is not constituted by the 
presence of another’s meaning but by any such meaning being the 
product of a sign system which at the same time renders such meaning 
ultimately indeterminable. It is this contradiction which characterises 
the otherness of language and our relationship to it. A message is 
possible only when produced through a sign system, and therefore 
through signs which are of necessity iterable. However, ‘by virtue of its 
essential iterability, a written syntagma can always be detached from 
the chain in which it is inserted without causing it to lose all possibility 
of its functioning’ (Derrida 1988: 9). It can be iterated in contexts 
which are ‘illimitable’ and which are ‘never absolutely determinable’ 
(1988: 3) and are ‘without any centre or absolute anchorage’ (Derrida 
1988: 12). Consequently, the meaning of an utterance is never finally 
determinable, even though at the same time it functions to communicate 
meaning. This contradiction represents in language an excess which can 
never be reduced to the meanings generated from language use, and 
this non-dialectical aporia Derrida places at the heart of language. The 
possibility of a unique communicative utterance relies on a code and 
signifiers whose iterability ensures such a unique utterance can never 
be finally secured. This contradiction cannot be resolved because it is 
the condition of meaning making. 
Elsewhere, Derrida suggests language is marked by a ‘wound’ which 
lies beyond hermeneutic interpretation: ‘Such a gaping belongs neither 
to the meaning, nor the phenomenon, nor to the truth, but, by making 
these possible in their remaining, it marks in the poem [or text] the 
hiatus of a wound whose lips will never close’ (Derrida 2005c: 152). 
This wound, he adds, ‘appeals to the other without condition, in the 
language of a hospitality that can no longer be subject to a decision’. 
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Thus there is in language a ‘dissemination irreducible to polysemy’ 
(Derrida 1988: 20) or to ‘hermeneutics in Gadamer’s sense’ (Derrida 
2005d: 165). As Derrida observes, ‘We can inventory a multiplicity of 
meaning’ (2005d: 165) but there is ‘always an excess that is not of the 
order of meaning’ (2005d: 165); it is this excess, a consequence of the 
iterability which marks language, which ensures an ‘independence’ of 
language which ‘continues to act’ even in the absence of a reader or 
writer (Derrida 1988: 8).
This non-translatable excess is also found at the material level of 
language. Derrida discusses the shibboleth as ‘the differential mark’ 
which in itself has no meaning yet ‘becomes what one must know ... to 
see oneself granted the right of asylum or the legitimate habitation of a 
language’ (Derrida 2005a: 26). The shibboleth has no meaning but ‘it is 
the ciphered mark that one must be able to partake of with the other, 
and this differential capability must be inscribed in oneself, that is, in 
one’s own body as much as in the body of one’s own language’ (2005a: 
26). There is of course nothing natural about the shibboleth, it is entirely 
cultural in nature, yet itself it has no meaning, it is from ‘the outside-
of-meaning ... the cipher of the cipher, the ciphered manifestation 
of the cipher as such’ (2005a: 27). Thus in the shibboleth we find 
‘insignificant difference as the condition of meaning’ (2005a: 28-9), 
an indispensable mark which is untranslatable itself. A shibboleth, 
such a mark distinguishing a text or language, is inseparable from 
language, and in a similar way Derrida notes how the juxtaposition of 
words against each other (and in particular the introduction of phrases 
from a different language into a text) have an effect which cannot be 
retained in translation. ‘Everything seems, in principle, translatable, 
except for the mark of the difference’ (2005a: 29).
We will return again to the significance of this material, non-
translatable yet indispensable element of language use in the next 
section when discussing the patchwriting practices of one of the 
students discussed. An engagement with language entails an 
engagement with the otherness of language, with that which cannot be 
translated, paraphrased or assimilated into already existing schemata, 
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and this engagement for Derrida involves a relationship of hospitality 
between the self and other. 
Thus, an impossibility marks both language and hospitality, or 
rather, both are wholly possible because of an irreducible contradiction 
or aporia which marks them. Derrida argues that ‘pure hospitality’, 
like a ‘pure gift’, is offered without expectation of anything in return, 
‘without horizon’ (Kearney and Dooley 1999: 70). The imperative 
underlying the concept of hospitality is that in welcoming the other 
to ‘make themselves at home’ the host offers to them all the rights and 
privileges the host enjoys. As Derrida notes, this is risky: the newcomer 
may wish to destroy your home. Nevertheless, ‘if you want to control 
this and exclude in advance this possibility there is no hospitality’ 
(Kearney and Dooley 1999: 70) and in practice borders are set up. 
‘Pure hospitality’ thus involves an opening of self, a vulnerability in 
which one’s relationship to the other cannot be regulated by ‘law’ but 
is supported only by trust. ‘Conditional hospitality’ is what we find 
practiced, in which limitations are necessarily imposed (see Derrida 
2001: 20-23). 
The setting up of boundaries or limitations is not, however, 
merely a self-interested act but a necessary act, since ‘pure hospitality’ 
would involve the host surrendering proprietorial rights over that to 
which the other is welcomed and in so doing surrendering the power 
necessary to act as host. Thus, occupying the position of host, which is 
necessary for hospitality to be extended, at the same time subverts the 
possibility of ‘pure hospitality’ in the name of which a host necessarily 
acts. True or ‘pure’ hospitality renders hospitality itself impossible 
and so hospitality necessarily fails to live up to itself. Consequently, 
particular instantiations of hospitality subvert the ‘universal’ concept 
which supports them and makes them possible. Imperfect, particular 
instantiations of hospitality are therefore not corrupt or shadowy forms 
of the ‘real’ thing, as a neoplatonic understanding might argue, but 
rather they are irreconcilable with this ‘universal’ while at the same 
time inseparable from it. It is this relationship between the particular 
and universal values of a concept, rather than a sharing between them 
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of some common ‘essence’, which is the condition of their possibility. 
For Derrida the privileging of one term in such a binary is therefore 
unjustified, yet it is such a privileging, on a more general scale, that he 
argues has plagued western metaphysics.
Still (2004: 115) suggests that ‘the laws of hospitality which govern 
the culturally sanctioned role of host as master of the house would fit 
with our sense of the author as master of his work’. On the one hand, 
we invite the texts of others into our own text, ‘suitable guests who will 
behave appropriately ... who are like me, speak my language’ (2004: 
115) or will in effect do my bidding. On the other hand, however, 
‘pure hospitality’ (Derrida in Kearney and Dooley 1999: 70) or ‘wild 
hospitality’, as Still puts it, opens the risk of being taken over by this 
language of others, of being open to ‘invasions by barbarians I do not 
know whose languages I do not speak’ (Still 2004: 115) and being 
taken over and treated badly (Derrida in Kearney and Dooley 1999: 70).
The tension that Still refers to, between attempting to ‘master’ the 
language to make it work according to my own intentions, and the 
risk of it taking over, is not strictly a choice or a struggle between two 
separate impulses. Rather, the sense of mastery is only possible because 
language will resist any such mastery – the iterability that enables a 
language to exist for us and make ‘mastery’ over meanings possible is 
precisely that which, at the same time, makes such mastery impossible. 
As with hospitality, inviting a word to make itself ‘at home’ (as guest) 
runs precisely the risk that it will do so and deprive us of our position as 
host/master. Thus while mastery is integral to hospitality and language 
use, it simultaneously undermines the possibility of hospitality and 
of the effectiveness of language. As Derrida observes, ‘There is ... in 
every utterance ... an inaccessible secret’ (Derrida 2005d: 164) and to 
not remain open to that ‘excess that is not of the order of meaning’ 
(2005d: 165) and to fix the meaning of a text would be to destroy 
the text (2005d: 166). In his own reading Derrida says ‘I try to make 
myself listen for something that I cannot hear or understand, attentive 
to marking the limits of my reading in my reading’ (2005d: 166) and 
consequently, he argues ‘one should speak while leaving to the other 
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the chance to speak, while giving floor to the other’ (Derrida 2005d: 
167). This is possible only if one has not already finalised the other’s 
speech by imposing on the text a final word, and if one remains open 
to the otherness of the excess in language.
Thus in language, as in hospitality, there is a threshold which is never 
arrived at, never actually crossed. We can argue that this circumstance 
describes well the position of a student who perhaps eagerly anticipates 
a discourse, but does not know what the discourse is and thus awaits it 
to reveal itself. But the border which divides the host from the guest 
and in so doing makes possible the constitution of both as such is 
itself a border that is spectral in quality, both present and not present 
simultaneously. To be host, one must of necessity be master of the 
space into which one invites a guest, but this of equal necessity limits 
the possibility of hospitality, since if the host is to remain master the 
guest can never take up hospitality in its proper sense of assuming the 
gifted unconditional right of presence. Thus, hospitality ‘forbids in some 
way even what it seems to allow to cross the threshold’ (Derrida 2000: 
14); ‘It remains forever on the threshold’, indeed, hospitality ‘becomes 
the threshold’. Hospitality is this aporia, its possibility predicated on 
its impossibility. In this respect we can never know it as such because 
‘once we know it, we no longer know it’ (Derrida 2000: 14): it can 
never be seized as such, its presence is marked also by its absence. Thus 
‘hospitality can only take place beyond hospitality’ and consequently 
it ‘is always to come, but a ‘to come’ that does not and never will 
present itself as such’ (Derrida 2000: 14). While the motivation for 
engagement with language is to achieve mastery and control over the 
meanings we communicate, language retains a secret which ensures 
mastery is never complete.
The language and discourses students engage with have a similar 
property. Of necessity, students experience the language they work 
with and the disciplinary discourses they must engage as ‘givens’ which 
they need to understand and acquire in order to utilise them effectively. 
Yet that which distinguishes a discourse or genre from other ones of 
necessity needs to be reproducible, and this iterability at the same time 
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ensures that the boundaries and discreteness of each can never be finally 
settled (Derrida 1988: 10). Thus, our relationship to language is marked 
by a struggle, a bodily struggle even, but not mastery or appropriation 
(Derrida 2005b: 101). 
I will now consider what this means for the two students discussed 
in this article. While we might see language as saturated with borders 
of various sorts (plagiarism / paraphrase; correct / incorrect grammar; 
generic forms; and so on), these borders exist in anticipation or 
retrospection, but are never actually encountered as such or crossed, 
and certainly never finally settled. Thus we might argue the moment 
of discourse acquisition never actually occurs: one can construe a 
discourse as an object one anticipates mastering at some stage, or one 
can identify oneself as already in possession of it, but these identity 
positions have illusory elements and the moment of identifying a 
discourse or acquiring it never actually arrives. One is always subject 
to the undecidability of language and consequently ‘identity is never 
given, received or attained; only the interminable and indefinitely 
phantasmatic process of identification endures’ (Derrida, 1998: 28). 
This applies equally to identities a person assumes as well as to those 
we attribute to and by which we distinguish discourses, genres and so 
on. Thus we are ‘neither inside nor outside’ language but instead find 
ourselves ‘on the shores’ of a language, ‘on the unplaceable line of its 
coast’ (Derrida 1998: 2).
4 Student engagement with legal texts 
Both students expressed some despair at the lack of background 
knowledge they had about the discipline and the content dealt with 
by the texts they engaged with. Both stated they did not know how 
their texts would be read, how marks were allocated; however, both 
responded in significantly different ways to their shared predicament. 
I would characterise Narin as engaging predominantly with the 
‘instrumental’ value of his sources, whereas Thuy was more concerned 
with their ‘intrinsic’ value, even though unavoidably they retained 
instrumental value (that is, they were made use of in order to fulfil the 
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assignment demands placed on her).
Narin sought to subject the texts he engaged with to existing 
interests and ideas he held. Thus he expressed great enthusiasm for 
texts he found which supported the position he had chosen to develop 
in his assignments, or because they provided a counter-argument he 
could use without seriously undermining his position. Nevertheless, 
while expressing great commitment to the position he defended in his 
assignments, he felt little conviction about his arguments. One reason 
for this was that he believed he had to rely on source texts and this not 
only hindered and frustrated his ability to express his point of view, 
but it also made his own text quite empty. That is, he felt all he could 
do was repeat what others said, but he could not say what he wanted 
to say. This suggests a relative lack of engagement with source authors; 
they were instead a ‘mine’ of information which he could instrumentally 
use when developing his own point of view, but doing so was in effect 
a process which frustrated expression of that point of view. That is, 
the authors he introduces into his texts as guests remain subjected to 
his mastery and are not permitted to speak. They are guests ‘who will 
behave appropriately ... who are like me’ (Still 2004: 115), allowed 
entry because they share Narin’s views and fit in with his plans. Thus, 
for Narin this welcome is both conditional and partial. They serve 
pre-given interests and he accommodates them in his text because the 
institution demands this of him. Unfortunately, he finds that having to 
acknowledge and incorporate them hinders the free expression of his 
ideas and their presence consequently diminishes the value he places 
on his finished text. 
One way of characterising Narin’s approach is to say that he does not 
engage with the otherness of the discourses he is dealing with. Thuy, in 
considerable contrast, does. Her stated desire is to acquire a sense of the 
discourses she engages with, and to find a voice in them, even though 
(like Narin) she feels she lacks the background knowledge necessary 
to make clear, solid and confident meanings from them. I would argue 
that her engagement with the ‘otherness’ of these discourses is achieved 
to a considerable extent through her ‘patchwriting’. For Howard (1995), 
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patchwriting refers to the process of creating a text or significant 
segments of a text largely from borrowed language chunks, whether at 
phrase or sentence level, creating in effect a patchwork composed from 
others’ writing. Thuy drew on such a practice, only at times representing 
the sourced wording as a quotation which she acknowledged. We can 
characterise her patchwriting as a form of ‘wild hospitality’ (Still 2004) 
or ‘pure hospitality’ (Derrida in Kearney and Dooley, 1999: 70). That 
is, Thuy invites into her text authors and their words which take over 
and ‘make themselves at home’, and in an important sense author her 
text. Thuy thus both authors her text and is authored; she engages with 
the words of others which criss-cross her text and in doing so both 
orchestrates meaning and surrenders to meanings that for her remain 
thin, ‘whose names I do not know’ (Still 2004:115). 
In this respect, the boundaries that Narin keeps so much in place 
between ‘host’ and ‘guest’ are now in Thuy’s case destabilised, or can 
even be said to be reversed, in that Thuy now becomes the guest of the 
discourse which ‘hosts’ the place she wishes to be welcomed into. Thus 
we see in Thuy’s circumstance the emergence of the ambiguity of the 
host-guest relationship Derrida speaks of, where the host yearns for 
the guest, even an unknown guest, who makes possible his existence 
as a host and therefore liberates the host (Derrida 2000:10). Thuy is 
thus constituted as writing subject in a relationship where, in Still’s 
ambiguous phrase which alludes to the desire underpinning any 
engagement with language, one relishes being ‘ravished by another’s 
tongue’ (Still 2004:115). 
But this relationship is not an easy one for Thuy. She speaks of 
profound anxiety as she struggles with her assignments, and I would 
suggest this reflects the dissolution of boundaries that she has hitherto 
worked within and which normally provide a secure sense of self and 
identity. But at the same time her texts provide her with a degree of 
satisfaction which is not explicable in terms of the institutional and 
instrumental purpose her texts serve: as Thuy claims, ‘I don’t care what 
mark I get’. Significantly, neither is it commitment to the position 
developed which provides this satisfaction: she admits ‘I don’t feel 
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strongly about the position I argue’. Instead her satisfaction is with 
the text itself. There is an engagement with language not reducible to 
meanings but which nevertheless provides considerable satisfaction 
and I suggest this can be viewed in light of the ambiguous host-
guest relationship she has with her source texts as representatives 
of the discourse she seeks to acquire and be welcomed into, and the 
constitution of herself as writing subject through that relationship; a 
subject exposed to the ‘inalienable alienation’ that is constitutive of the 
subject in language (Derrida 1998: 25).
Despite the heavy patchwriting her text incorporated, Thuy spoke 
of the words as being hers, a statement I believe reflected a genuine 
experience. Her process wasn’t one of appropriating the ideas and 
words of others to fulfil already given interests, which, as we have 
seen in Narin’s case, results in frustration when they cannot be easily 
subdued and made to do his bidding. In contrast, the boundaries upon 
which the possibility of frustration depends are dissolved and instead 
it is anxiety which predominates as Thuy finds herself, as writing 
subject, surrendering to a discourse which she believes to exist yet 
which remains unknown to her. In this way she is closer than Narin 
to a sense or experience of the ‘promise’ which ‘precedes all language’ 
(Derrida 1998:66).
Thuy approaches in a state of expectation that there is a language, 
a gift of language (1998: 67) which she wishes to receive, even though 
she does not know what that gift is apart from the name she gives it 
(common law discourse). She enters into a relationship of trust with 
language rather than control, and thus exposes herself to that which is 
other, precisely in the sense that it is unknown to her yet presupposed 
as having a presence. As Derrida remarks, that which is ‘other’ ‘is 
infinitely other’ and ‘we never have any access to the other as such’ 
(1999: 71, original italics). Thus it remains unknown, yet a determinate 
object to be possessed. Thuy is in this relationship to common law 
discourse. While there is therefore a sense of a boundary to cross (a 
point of entry into the discourse) this boundary nevertheless remains 
undetermined for her.
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This discourse-object therefore is a peculiar one: it is precisely 
because it is unknown and non-defined that it can exist as an imagined 
‘determinate’ object for Thuy, organising her desire and facilitating her 
engagement. This discourse she engages with is therefore characterised 
by being simultaneously both present and absent, a kind of spectre, 
where an idea is non-identical with itself, marked by a ‘trace’, a term 
Derrida uses to describe ‘the part played by the radically other within 
the structure of difference that is the sign’ (Spivak 1976: xvii). There 
is the assumption of a discourse which through engagement can 
be possessed or mastered, but where engagement instead leads to 
‘transformation, change and displacement’ (Derrida 2005b: 104). 
Writing is always a rewriting. Thus ‘language, the word – in a way the 
life of the word – is in essence spectral ...  it repeats itself, as itself, and 
is every time other’ (Derrida 2005b: 104). Unlike Narin, it is with this 
spectral quality that Thuy works.
The act of producing a text does, of course, require judgments 
be made. Thuy does sometimes make judgments of an instrumental 
nature, according to prior knowledge or interests, and sometimes 
using relatively arbitrary criterion. She says she sometimes follows 
a ‘conservative’ line because she feels it is ‘safer’, more established, 
and other times holds onto an idea or line of thought because she is 
‘fascinated’ by it. However, she also states that on numerous occasions 
she reached a point where making a decision about what to say, which 
direction to pursue, was ‘very difficult’ and all she could do was ‘ just 
try’. The plaintiveness with which she said this added to the sense that at 
such points she found herself without bearings, without a rule to follow, 
but nevertheless had to continue.  Such moments suggest exposure to 
the aporia we have noted characterise hospitality and language. 
For Derrida hospitality only begins when we press against the 
impossibility of hospitality (2000:14) or ‘experience (which means travel 
or go through) this paralysis’ (Caputo 1997: 111), where hospitality 
‘remains forever on the threshold of itself ’ (Derrida 2000: 14). In 
language, this aporia exists at the moment where language itself cannot 
be in possession of determinate meaning, not because of multiple 
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possible contexts which open up multiple interpretations, but because 
that which makes meaning possible [iteration, citationality] at the same 
time ensures that it cannot be possible (Derrida 1988). There is a ‘non-
identity of itself to any language’ (Derrida 2005b: 101) and a moment 
in making judgments where following a rule fails us.2
The dissemination of meaning in language therefore ensures there 
is always an excess ‘irreducible to hermeneutics’ (Derrida 2005d: 
165) or to the potentially multiple but singular meanings we produce 
and for Derrida this excess calls us ‘to listen for something I cannot 
hear or understand’ in the text (2005d: 166). Thuy’s desire to acquire 
the common law discourse places her in precisely this position of 
listening for what as yet she cannot hear, of refusing the boundaries 
that are constructed by existing understandings and interests which 
Narin, I have suggested, remains attached to.  This pressing against 
the impossibility inherent in language brings us closer to the ‘abiding 
alienation’ of the subject within language; not an alienation of an 
already given subject but an alienation which is the subject, which 
brings it into being (Derrida 1998: 25). Thus we find ‘a terror inside 
languages’ which ‘is our subject’ (1998: 23). In the case of Thuy, the 
ontological state – of uncertainty and of terror –Derrida speaks of can 
be linked, I would suggest, to the anxiety and depression she spoke of 
which accompanied her at times while struggling with her assignments. 
The difference I have tried to outline between Narin and Thuy is 
manifested, as might be expected, in the texts they produce. Principally, 
Narin’s text was composed of paraphrase and what is commonly referred 
to as his ‘own’ wording, except where he provided cited quotes. In 
contrast, in addition to cited quotations, Thuy’s text, as already noted, 
was heavily patchwritten. However, Thuy’s text was not, in my view, 
an instrumental manipulation of source texts, a means of ‘cobbling 
together’ a text in order to get through her course. She stated that in 
fact she had been quite worried about plagiarism while writing; her 
main fear was that she might formulate ideas of her own which others, 
unknown to her, had already expressed.  Furthermore, when asked 
about the language in her text, she insisted quite strongly that the 
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language, the words, were ‘hers’. In my view this was not an attempt 
to deceive,3 but rather an expression of the subjective relationship she 
had with the language. 
For Narin, the intertextual activity he engages in reduces the sense 
he has of his own ‘presence’ in his text; having to use sources diminishes 
his capacity to express his point of view. For Thuy, in contrast, the 
intertextual activity enhances her sense of presence, but not at the level 
of meanings, which for her lack sufficient richness, but at the level of 
text. I now want to link this sense of participation, of ‘self ’, of ‘owning’ 
the words that find their way into her text, to the excess in language that 
follows from the iterable and citational nature of language and which 
gives rise to a ‘dissemination which exceeds polysemy’ (Derrida 1988: 
21), that is, to a dissemination not explicable in terms of the multiple 
meanings a text may be given.
For Derrida, every sign ‘can be cited, put between quotation marks’ 
but this also means ‘it can break with every given context, engendering 
an infinity of new contexts in a manner which is absolutely illimitable’ 
(1988: 12). He points out, however, that ‘this does not imply that the 
mark is valid outside of a context, but on the contrary that there are only 
contexts without any centre or absolute anchorage’. This possibility is 
not accidental to the mark but its absolute condition, ‘without which a 
mark could not even have a function which is called ‘normal’ (1988: 12).
As already noted, both students stated they lacked sufficient 
disciplinary context or understanding of the background from which 
their source texts emerged. Narin dealt with this problem largely by 
invoking contexts and interests he was already familiar with.  This led 
to some frustration with understanding his sources as well as using 
them, but by and large they presented him with ideas he felt he could 
work with. In this process he willingly rewrites his sources to align 
them with the interests he has and causes them to speak in his voice. 
He uses ‘citation or reference as ornamentation; choice jewels or flowers 
which decorate or embellish the master’s house’ (Still 20004:115). In 
contrast, Thuy resists such a move in her bid to be open to this other 
discourse, but because she has no firm sense of a context in which 
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to situate her understanding, having refused to privilege both prior 
interests and understandings she brings and the institutional one she 
finds herself in, the possibility of paraphrase is less available to her. 
Instead she does not give way on her desire to privilege the disciplinary 
discourses and their contexts. 
Therefore, I suggest that for Thuy the source texts themselves, as 
text, provide a substitute context. They are in fact not a means to an 
end, but the embodiment of the end Thuy seeks, that is, the disciplinary 
discourse. They do not merely provide symbolic representations of a 
discourse which lurks ‘behind’ them in some way, but are icons of the 
discourse and as such the texts she engages with are the discourse. Her 
desire to engage with a discourse which in its presumed uniqueness is in 
excess of that which can be rewritten, the non-translatable idiom of the 
discourse as it were, that which distinguishes it, binds her to the texts. 
In this respect to re-write or paraphrase can risk losing the discourse 
she is seeking to acquire, rather than provide a means by which she 
accesses it. Paraphrase places at risk that which she experiences as 
distinguishing the discourse in the texts she engages with, even though 
she is certainly capable of paraphrase, as demonstrated in an interview 
when asked to orally outline some of the ideas she had worked with. 
For Derrida, that which distinguishes a text in its uniqueness and is 
most proper to it is its idiom, and this ‘what is most proper in language 
cannot be appropriated’ (2005: 101) since to paraphrase is to speak that 
which is unique in ‘a language whose generality takes on a value that 
is in some way structured, universal, transcendental’ and hence no 
longer unique (Derrida 1998: 20). This non-translatable idiom of the 
text is not found by Thuy in the sense of meaning but is given by the 
material text itself. The text embodies this discursive uniqueness and it 
is retained in a re-iteration of the text. Context itself is not brought to 
the text to make sense of it, but is given by the materiality of the text.
 This is not a matter of the student lacking the ability to paraphrase, 
or believing that the original says things in a better way than the student 
can. While the student may believe this is so, I am suggesting that there 
is an element in the original which cannot be said in a different way 
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and it is this which Thuy identifies with the discourse she is engaging 
with. As her assessor commented, Thuy has sufficient ability in English 
to organise her patchwritten text into a ‘seamless’ text; thus, the 
patchwritten text provides her bedrock, against which she does indeed 
provide quotations and citations to foreground authorship or wording 
usually to good rhetorical effect. Indeed, her lecturer stated that if this 
text is plagiarised, ‘it is such a magnificent piece of plagiarism (she laughs 
quite forcefully) that it either can’t be, or, you know, [she] almost deserves 
credit for it [she has] strung it together seamlessly well’. Although the 
lecturer carried out basic checks for plagiarism, she decided ‘why would 
[Thuy] spend so much effort doing such a supreme piece of plagiarism. 
That’s just too much work. It’s easier to write yourself ’. 
Thus, although Thuy was able to establish meaning in such a 
way that her reader read her text as, largely, a seamless unity, for 
Thuy the position developed was not, as already noted, the source 
of her satisfaction. Instead, her satisfaction lay in her text, and I am 
suggesting this is tied to an operation of language which exceeds and 
is not reducible to meanings realised through the text, that is, it is 
tied to the excess Derrida argues belongs to citationality. As Thuy 
seeks to cross the border from familiar discourses to another, it is the 
citationality integral to language which she identifies with and thus 
the material words she encounters provide the medium for crossing, 
like the shibboleth (Derrida 2005a), and it is in this moment of excess 
irreducible to meaning that the words she takes up are experienced 
as her own. We can perhaps juxtapose her practice against Derrida’s 
statement that ‘to translate is to lose the body’ of the text (2005d: 168), 
this body which is ‘the uniqueness incorporated, incarnated, in what 
one used to call the ‘signifiers’, in the graphemes which in themselves 
cannot be translated’ (2005d: 168). It is this attempt to engage with the 
unique object-discourse, via her source texts, which I am suggesting 
exposes Thuy to the ‘excess’ by which she is carried forward and so 
engages with the ‘otherness’ of the discourse she seeks to acquire. 
There is much more which needs to be said about how identification 
with the materiality of a text occurs, but this cannot be pursued here. 
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However, the idea that subjects are constituted through identification 
and positioning by discourses is a widely held view. For example, 
critical discourse analysis (see Fairclough 1992) attempts precisely to 
show how identities are formed and positioned by discourses and their 
meanings. A difficulty with such approaches in general is that there is 
little explanation of how a subject takes up the positions a discourse is 
said to provide, of what aligns the participants with a given reading, 
with specific symbolic meanings, especially when the discourse is 
new to the reader. I am suggesting that the materiality of texts also 
needs to be taken into account, and it is possible to argue that Thuy 
engages with the texts as icons of the discourses she seeks to acquire. 
It is through this relationship at the iconic level of meaning that Thuy 
is constituted as a subject and which in consequence causes her to 
subjectively experience the language as hers, that is, as that in which 
she herself has come to being as an imaginary subject of the discourse 
represented by the texts. Through the materiality of the signifiers this 
sense of ‘self ’ is provided and it is for this reason the language she uses 
is experienced as her own.
5 Conclusion
In this article I have argued that language and discourse are 
engaged with through a relationship similar to that of the host-guest 
in hospitality. Such a relationship presupposes definitive categories 
and identities which at the same time are at risk of subversion by the 
process of engagement. For Derrida, neither moment – of maintaining 
such categories, or of their dissolution – is to be privileged since both 
are mutually dependent upon the other. For this reason there is a ‘non-
identity to itself of any language’ (Derrida 2005b: 101) and indeed, 
of subjective identity.  Yet working with determinate categories and 
concepts is unavoidable, and as such clear boundaries are usually 
maintained and indeed insisted upon. 
For students, the process of learning can be often viewed as one of 
‘crossing’ boundaries, navigating between a wide range of definitive 
classifications, one of which has to do with the distinction between 
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‘paraphrase’ and ‘plagiarism’ which is generally quite rigidly policed. In 
this article I have argued that engagement with unfamiliar discourses by 
students can follow a path where existing rules, categories or identities, 
both institutionally and self-imposed, are maintained, or one can 
engage in the kind of ‘bodily struggle’ which exposes the uncertainty 
of the boundaries such categories rely on and leads the student into 
unknown territory where boundaries distinguishing discourses and 
self are struggled with.
 I have argued that in Thuy’s case, reaching a point of producing a 
text which is ‘hers’ involves the creation of a self in relation to her sources 
which from the perspective of a rigid rule about plagiarism might 
seem illegitimate. Yet for both Thuy and her lecturer-assessor, while 
‘plagiarism’ remains a signifier marking something strictly prohibited, 
its signified is far less determinable. The boundaries dividing what is and 
is not permissible become uncertain and are reinvented. Engagement 
with discourse effects a change in such boundaries and consequently 
in the subject engaging with it, and I have suggested that in Thuy’s 
case such changes are not reducible to engagement with the symbolic 
function of language alone but they are also intimately bound to her 
engagement with the materiality of text. 
Notes
1 Narin summarised his legal experience as follows: ‘I completed a Bachelor 
degree and then took another year to finish uh [pause] Thai barrister’.
2  See Derrida 1990 (also in Kearney and Dooley 1999: 66) where a decision 
entails a ‘responsibility heterogeneous to knowledge’. 
3  See Pecorari 2003 for similar comments.
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